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TORTS-LIBEL-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETRACTION STATUTE ELIMINATING GENERAL DAMAGES REcoVERY-Following publication of allegedly libelous statements made by defendants during a televised news broadcast,
plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages. Defendants' motion to
strike the allegations of general and punitive damages was granted by the
trial court since the complaint did not allege that defendants intended to
defame plaintiff, or that defendants refused to publish a requested retraction of a non-intentional libel, both of which are conditions precedent
to recovery of such damages under the Oregon statute. 1 Plaintiff failed
to plead further and judgment was entered for defendants. On appeal to
the Oregon Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The plaintiff's failure to com-

1 ORE. REv. STAT, § 30.160 (1955) which provides:
"(l) In an action for damages on account of a defamatory statement published or
broadcast in a newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by radio, television or
motion pictures, the plaintiff shall not recover general damages unless: (a) A correction
or retraction is demanded but not published as provided in ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.165; or
(b) The plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant actually
intended to defame the plaintiff. (2) Where the plaintiff is entitled to recover general
damages, the publication of a correction or retraction may be considered in mitigation
of damages."
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ply with the statute for general damages recovery was fatal to the cause
of action, and the substitution of a retraction for an allowance of general
damages does not violate the Oregon Constitution or the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.2 Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting Co., 365
P.2d 845 (Ore. 1961).
At common law it was generally held that a plaintiff defamed by libel
may recover general damages-presumed injury to reputation-without
pleading or proving actual damage. 3 However, with the exception of certain categories of imputation, it has been held that where extrinsic facts
are necessary to prove the imputation conveyed, such libel "per quod" is
not actionable without proof of special damages-actual injury to reputation.4 But where the plaintiff can recover general damages, a retraction by a
publisher precludes an allowance of punitive damages absent actual malice,
and such retraction may also be shown in mitigation of general damages.Ii
The recent advent and rapid growth of various types of mass communication media has created a need for new and appropriate rules of law,
both substantive and procedural, in the defamation area. 6 Common law
libel doctrines, complicated by problems of strict liability,7 chain liability,8
2 The statute was attacked as violating the equal protection clause of article I, § 20,
of the Oregon Constitution, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The central point of
attack was upon article I, § 10, of the Oregon Constitution which states: "Every man
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person, property
or reputation." The court in upholding the statute held in reference to article I, § 10,
that the legislature can modify or limit remedies consistent with the Oregon Constitution, and even if not, a retraction is a substantial equivalent of general damages.
3 PRossER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955). See generally Veeder, History and Theory of the
Law of Defamation (pts. 1-2), 3 CoLuM. L. REv. 546 (1903); 4 id. 33 (1904); Comment,
69 HARV. L. R.Ev. 875 (1956).
4 See authorities cited note 3 supra.
5 See, e.g., Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394, 47 Pac. 129 (1896); Mcyerle v. Pioneer
Publishing Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920); Webb v. Call Publishing Co., 173
Wis. 45, 180 N.W. 263 (1920).
6 See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1946); Donnelly, The Law of Defamation; Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L. REv. 609
(1949).
7 Hulton &: Co. v. Jones, [1909] 2 K.B. 444, affirmed, [1910] A.C. 20. Sec PROSSER,
TORTS § 94 (2d ed. 1955). Closely related is liability imposed for repeating a defamation.
The principal case is a good example, as the defendant television station published a
grand jury report in a news broadcast. See principal case at 846. See, e.g., W'ood v.
Constitution Publishing Co., 57 Ga. App. 123, 194 S.E. 760 (1937), afj'd mem., 187 Ga.
377, 200 S.E. 131 (1938) (defendant liable for publishing press agency dispatches); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press Co., 46 Mich. 341, 9 N.W. 501 (1881) (liability resulted from
publishing opinion of third person). In Rogers v. Courier Post Co., 2 N.J. 393, 66 A.2d
869 (1949), the defendant newspaper quoted an assistant prosecutor who made defamatory statements, and although accurate and fairly reported without malice, the court
held defendant liable.
s A cause of action at common law arises for each publication of the defamatory
statement to each different person. As this proved too harsh when applied to mass
news media, a doctrine was developed that an entire edition of a newspaper or a
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and the possibility of extortionate suits, when added to the ever-present
difficulty of measuring damages,9 have served as an effective deterrent to
the free dissemination of news to the public. Further highlighting the precarious position of a publisher has been the fact that even the exercise
of due care would not always prevent the publication of defamatory statements, from which liability followed.1° As a result, many state legislatures
have enacted retraction statutes11 which provide a substitutionary remedy
for general damages, thereby precluding the application of the otherwise
onerous general damages burden thrust upon news publishers for unintentional libels. But when state legislatures have so acted, the state courts
have usually either held the statutes invalid as unconstitutional1 2 or
interpreted them to permit recovery of all but punitive damages,13 thereby
frustrating the manifest legislative policy. For example, in Minnesota
where a retraction statute was upheld, it was held to apply only if the
defendant proved that the libel was published in good faith, a term interpreted to mean freedom from fault, including negligence. 14 The principal
case follows the affirmative path set by Werner v. Southern Cal. Associated
Newspapers, 15 which upheld a retraction statute in •the face of constitumagazine was to be regarded as a single publication for which only one cause of action
would lie within a state. The significant limitation on the "single publication" rule,
however, is that it does not cross a state line; hence, conceivably, one could have fifty
causes of action. This presents the unsettled question of what law would apply to each
cause of action. For a discussion of "chain libel" suits, see Prosser, Interstate Publications,
51 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1953).
See McCORMICK, DAMAGES § 117 (1935).
See, e.g., Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889, 890 (W .D. Mo. 1934);
Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933). See also Keller, Federal
Control of Defamation by Radio, 12 NoTRE DAME LAw. 134, 154, 172 (1936); Vold,
Defamation by Radio, 19 MINN. L. R.Ev. 6Il, 632 (1935).
11 See Note, 36 ORE. L. R.Ev. 70, 71 (1956) for a complete classified list of retraction
statutes by states.
12 See, e.g., Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670, 75 Pac. 1041 (1904) (plaintiff deprived
of a remedy without "due course of law" under Kansas constitution); Park v. Detroit
Free Press Co., 72 ~Iiclt. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888) (denial of equal protection); Neafie v.
Hoboken Printing &: Publishing Co., 75 N.J.L. 564, 68 Atl. 146 (1907) (legislature has
no power to eliminate remedy for injured reputation); Byers v. Meridian Printing Co.,
84 Ohio 408, 95 N.E. 917 (1911) (plaintiff deprived of a remedy without due process of
law).
13 See, e.g., Comer v. Age Herald Publishing Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673 (1907) in
which a retraction statute which provided for a recovery of "actual damages" only after
a retraction was construed to permit both general and special damages. Accord, Ross v.
Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950); Ellis v. Brockton Publishing Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E.
1018 (1908); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904); Meyerle v. Pioneer
Publishing Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920). Cf. Moore v. Stevenson, 27 Conn. 13
(1858), in which actual damages was construed to mean special damages but malice was
held to encompass negligence as well as any wrongful state of mind. See note 1 supra.
As to the "mangling" of retraction statutes by judicial interpretation, see Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 !LL. L. REv. 36 (1937).
14 Allan v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889).
15 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950), appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 910 (1951), 38 CALIF.
L. R.Ev. 951 (1950). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 252 (1950).
9

10

830

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

tional attacks. The California statute, though its coverage is not so broad,16
went a step farther than the Oregon statute in question. In California, a
retraction is a substitute for general and punitive damages in the case
of deliberate and malicious as well as inadvertent libel. 17 Thus, in those
states where the constitutionality of the retraction statute has been upheld,
and where they have been construed and applied without significant judicial abrogation, the plaintiff is left with a right only to special damages-actual pecuniary injury-in most cases impossible, or at least quite difficult, to prove, and to a retraction which may or may not be a suitable
remedy for his damaged reputation.
While the deterrent effect of a retraction statute may not be as strong
as the threat of a law suit and subsequent financial loss,18 it offers significant
advantages in the furtherance of truthful and comprehensive news reporting. For a retraction will, to the extent that the same audience sees it,
promptly inform this segment of the public of the falsity or mistake of the
original publication and therefore can arguably be more effective in repairing the plaintiff's reputation than a less publicized damage recovery
through litigation at a much later date. Moreover, retraction statutes, by
encouraging the publication of retractions to avoid general damages recoveries, obviate the necessity of recourse to litigation to correct misstatements.19 Without going so far as the California statute, which includes
intentional libel, the Oregon statute seems to offer the best approach.20
It facilitates a free dissemination of news by avoiding strict liability
without fault as to publishers, and also provides protection for the
individual's reputation by means of a published retraction or a damage
action in the case of intentional defamation. Aside from the arguments
for or against retraction statutes, the principal case indicates a relaxation
16 CALIF. CIV. CoDE § 48(a) covers only newspapers and radio broadcasts whereas the
Oregon retraction statute includes all media. See note 1 supra.
17 CALIF. CIV. CoDE § 48(a).
18 See Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. R.Ev. 36 (1937).
Some would argue that the power of the press to destroy is too great, and that it can
better bear the loss through libel insurance. See Libel Insurance, Bus. Week, June 8,
1946, p. 61; Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposals for Reform, 33 MINN. L. R.Ev.
609 (1949).
19 See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1
(1946).
20 One writer has suggested a statutory right of reply is the best approach to provide
a substitute remedy for general damages. See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors
in the Press, 60 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1 (1946). See, e.g., NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 200.570 (1960) which
requires that a denial of a libelous article be published by any newspaper or periodical
circulated within the state and failure to comply with the provisions of this section
makes one subject to criminal penalties. The right of reply is not only subject to
attack as to its feasibility, but it would not require the publisher to notify the public
as to its falsity, and, in effect, the public would receive two sides to an alleged libel
without knowing which is the correct view. A retraction, on the other hand, offers to
the plaintiff tangible proof of the falsity of the libel for use in the future when confronted with questions concerning his reputation.
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of the judicial hostility which had characterized the nullification by the
courts of retraction statutes enacted at the tum of the century, and a
continuation of the trend started by Werner to uphold such remedial legislative action.
However, even with judicial acceptance of the retraction statute concept, there remains a possibility of circumventing such statutes by resort
to a different theory of tort liability, invasion of the right of privacy. Several aspects of the right of privacy, namely public disclosure of private facts
and the publication of facts which place one in a false light, also concern
reputation. To this extent, similarities exist between libel and the right of
privacy.21 Thus, in certain cases, the publication of a libel will offer the
injured party a choice of remedies, 22 which assumes importance since an
invasion of privacy also permits a recovery of general damages, truth not
being recognized as a defense. 23 Perhaps the mere fact that feelings, peace
of mind and privacy have been intruded upon by a libel, in addition to
the injuries to reputation and character caused ·thereby, justifies recovery
for an invasion of privacy.24 But this apparently inconsistent result, depending on what theory the cause of action is based upon, would seemingly
serve to nullify the objectives of the retraction statutes,25 at least in certain
factual settings, and, as such, is somewhat undesirable. To preclude this
anomaly, the better approach would be to construe retraction statutes as
pre-empting the treatment of all defamatory statements in any theory of
tort thus preventing a general damages recovery through claims of a violation of the right of privacy.2 6
John W. Galanis
21 See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). Although the right of privacy
has yet to be fully defined, Oregon has apparently recognized its existence in Hinish
v. Meier &: Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P .2d 438 (1941).
22 Plaintiff in the principal case conceivably might have used this theory of recovery. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Pavesick
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911), where counts of both libel and invasion of privacy
were upheld.
23 See, e.g., Reed v. Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Kerby
v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). See generally Green,
The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237 (1932); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383
(1960).
24 One could argue that if libel really invades two different interests the law can
provide a choice of two alternative remedies and to limit this choice on the ground of
a public predisposition for the strictness of a libel action is not a proper judicial function.
25 This development has apparently been used and accepted in California. See
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942). Compare Gill v.
Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P .2d 441 (1953), with Gill v. Curtis Publishing
Co,, 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P .2d 630 (1952). See Powsner, Libel in Limbo: Another Conquest
for the Right of Privacy?, 30 L.A.B. BULL. 365 (1955).
:la At least one court in dictum said that invasion of privacy was not a substitute
remedy for a libel suit. Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 349, 174 S.W.2d 510,
512 (1943).

